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EXTENSION CLAUSES IN LOUISIANA LISTING
AGREEMENTS
John M. Norwood*
Cornelius J. Hyde**
In a typical real estate brokerage contract, generally referred to
as a "listing agreement," the broker undertakes the obligation of
finding a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase the described
property for the price specified or on any other terms acceptable to
the seller. If the broker accomplishes this within the listing period,
he is entitled to a commission, normally expressed as a percentage
of the price obtained. Unfortunately for brokers, sellers have proven
to be extremely resourceful in devising schemes to avoid paying the
agreed commissions. One common ploy has been the owner's refusal
to accept the buyer's offer during the listing period, only to accept a
similar offer from the same buyer shortly after the period has ex-
pired. Louisiana courts have been quick to find that under such cir.
cumstances the commission has nonetheless been earned, since the
broker was in fact the "procuring cause" of the sale.'
In order to afford the broker even greater protection, most
listing agreements include an extension clause (sometimes referred
to as a "protection clause"). The extension clause generally provides
that if, within some designated period after the expiration of the
listing agreement, the property is sold to a person with whom the
broker has carried on some designated activity during the listing,
the commission is to be paid. Thus, two time periods are discernible:
the listing period and a subsequent extension period. The extension
clause itself delineates what must transpire between the broker and
the eventual purchaser for the commission to be collectable. But, in
any event, the presence of the extension clause should prevent the
broker from having to meet the rigid standard of having been a
&&procuring cause" of the sale.
In preparing this article the authors obtained copies of listing
agreements prepared by Boards of Realtors in various parts of the
state. Of the eleven listing agreements examined, ten had extension
clauses. The extension clauses presently in use vary widely in their
terminology, but can be grouped as follows:2
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1. See text at note 6, infra.
2. Emphasis is supplied.
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a. "provided purchaser has become intgrested in said property
as a result of the efforts or advertising of said REALTOR
. . ." (4 forms used this language)
b. "with anyone to whom said property has been quoted..
(2 forms)
c. "with anyone to whom said property has been submitted ..
(1 form)
d. "to whom said property was shown or submitted by anyone
(or with whom negotiations involving said property had been
carried on) . . ." (1 form)
e. "to whom the property was shown by an Agent (prior to the
termination date) and the'negotiations resulting in the sale
and/or exchange were carried on prior to the termination of
this agreement" (1 form)
f. "to anyone with whom the REALTOR has had negotiation
prior to final termination . . ." (1 form).
Given the diverse language of the clauses, one would assume
that they are intended to have a variety of meanings. For example,
whatever meaning is attached to the expression "become
interested," it need not be the same as that of "quoted,"
"submitted," or "negotiated." Thus, the broker's right to his commis-
sion should be based on whether the contractual provision of the ex-
tension clause in question has been satisfied. If, for instance, the
clause requires that the property be "quoted," then the central in-
quiry should be whether that did indeed transpire during the listing.
Unfortunately, Louisiana courts have not always measured the
broker's actions against the requisites of his contract. In some cases,
for example, a court has compared the broker's conduct to conduct
in a previous case even though the respective extension clauses
were entirely different.' It is clearly illogical to attach identical
meanings to contractual provisions that are unquestionably not iden-
tical.
The purpose of an extension clause is often misunderstood. In
some cases the broker was held to be entitled to his commission
only if he could show that he was the "procuring cause" of the sale.'
As has been noted, this analysis is correct only if no extension
clause exists. The very reason for the extension clause is to afford
the broker additional protections not allowed by the procuring cause
3. Caruso-Goll v. La Nasa, 72 So. 2d 13 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954); Alan F.
Dreyfus Co., Inc. v. Friedman, 129 So. 679 (La.1930).
4. Harvey v. Sims, 198 So. 389 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940); Carter v. Hayes, 337 So.
2d 295 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
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doctrine. A court which reverts to the procuring cause doctrine is
failing to recognize the quite different contractual obligations freely
agreed to by both parties in the listing agreement. Fortunately, re-
cent appellate court decisions seem to be rejecting this line of
reasoning.'
The purpose of this article is to review and analyze the
precedents established by Louisiana courts in real estate listing con-
tracts. The following topics will be discussed: (a) obligations if the
listing agreement does not contain an extension clause (the procur-
ing cause doctrine), (b) obligations if the agreement contains any of
the various types of extension clauses, (c) obligations if the sale is
completed after the expiration of the extension clause, and (d)
miscellaneous problems. For the sake of simplicity, the identity of
the purchaser will not be given; he will be referred to merely as X.
OBLIGATIONS IF THE LISTING AGREEMENT DOES NOT CONTAIN
AN EXTENSION CLAUSE: THE PROCURING CAUSE DOCTRINE
In the absence of an extension clause the broker is forced to re-
ly upon the assertion that justice and fair play call for the payment
of the commission. Essentially, the broker's claim is based on a
theory of quantum meruit; the owner should not be allowed to avail
himself of the efforts of the broker without paying a fair compensa-
tion. In 1902 the Louisiana Supreme Court established the following
rule: "The broker, in order to be entitled to his commission, must
have been the procuring cause of the transaction. He cannot recover
unless he proves his authority to act, and that he was the procuring
agency in effecting the sale."'
Louisiana courts have generally accepted the following defini-
tion of procuring cause:
As used in that branch of the law relating to brokers' commis-
sions, the terms "procuring cause," "efficient cause," and "prox-
imate cause" have substantially, if not quite, the same meaning
and are often used interchangeably; they refer to a cause
originating or setting in motion a series of events which without
break in their continuity, result in the accomplishment of the
prime object of the employment of the broker, which may
variously be a sale or exchange of the principal's property, an
5. Harkey v. Gahagan, 338 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
6. Taylor v. Martin, 109 La. 137, 143, 33 So. 112, 115 (1902) (emphasis added).
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ultimate agreement between the principal and a prospective con-
tracting party, or the procurement of a purchaser who is ready,
willing, and able to buy on the principal's terms.'
Five reported cases were found in which the broker was allowed
his commission under this doctrine even though the sale was not
completed until after the listing period has expired.' The overriding
characteristic of these cases is the unbroken sequence of events con-
necting the efforts of the broker with the buyer's purchase of the
property.
In Saturn Realty, Inc. v. Muller,9 the work of the broker had
resulted in the execution of a purchase agreement between the
owner and the buyer during the listing period. The buyer, however,
was unable to obtain the required loan during the period provided
for in the contract, and the sale fell through. Thereafter the owner
and the buyer engaged in further negotiations of which the broker
was not informed, and one week after the expiration of the listing
agreement a second purchase agreement was signed. The owner
argued that no commission was owed since the listing agreement
had expired, but the court disagreed, reasoning as follows:
Generally, in the absence of an existing exclusive agency con-
tract, where an agent has failed to effect a sale and negotiations
have ceased or broken off, the owner may himself complete the
sale and the fact that the sale may have been aided in some
degree by previous efforts of the agent does not of itself entitle
the latter to a commission; but based on the equitable maxim
that the principal shall not be permitted to enrich himself at the
expense of the agent whose services have inured to his benefit,
the agent is entitled to a commission when it clearly appears
that his efforts were the procuring cause of the sale.... We also
find that negotiations for the sale and purchase between [XJ and
[the owner] continued without interruption following the
homestead association's refusal to lend the full amount of
$15,800 until those negotiations culminated in the agreement of
April 30, 1965, approximately one week after the termination of
the first agreement by reason of the non-fulfillment of the
suspensive condition, and the sale of May 5, 1965 ....
7. See also, Sleet v. Hardin, 383 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Carter v.
Hayes, 337 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Cramer v. Guercio, 331 So. 2d 550 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1976), Sleet v. Williams, 291 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
8. See notes 9, 11, 12, 16, & 18, infra.
9. 196 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
10. Id. at 323. The court went on to say:
Nor does the fact that ... [the owner] may have reduced the purchase price by
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A similar result may be found in Rolston v. Buff." Just after
notifying the broker of his desire to terminate the listing, the owner
sold the property to someone who had earlier been shown the house
by the broker. The purchase was made on the same terms as those
proferred by the broker, and no additional showing of the premises
was required. The court concluded that the efforts of the broker
were the procuring cause of the sale, though it may have been in-
fluenced by its obvious suspicion that the only reason for the
owner's cancellation of the listing was his desire to avoid paying the
brokerage commission.
This element of possible fraud was clearly a factor in the case of
Sollie v. People's Bank & Trust Co."2 In Sollie a broker, who had a
listing agreement for an unspecified period, had no contact what-
soever with the ultimate purchasers. The purchasers learned of the
availability of the property by means of an advertisement placed by
the broker in the local newspaper. The purchasers inspected the
property on their own and subsequenly examined the conveyance
records to determine the identity of the owner. They then contacted
the owner, who allegedly wrote his broker saying that "we (the
owners) may be able to sell it ourselves" and that "it is our
understanding that from this date on if you sell the property you
will receive a commission on same, but if we sell it ourselves or
through some other source you will not be entitled to any commis-
sion." Approximately thirty-seven days later the owner sold the
property directly to the purchaser. The broker denied receiving the
above letter, but the court stated that the question of receipt was
unimportant since in its opinion the broker was the procuring cause
of the sale:
There is no doubt that plaintiff did all, or practically all that a
broker would be expected to do to find a purchaser.... Through
plaintiffs efforts a purchaser was found who paid the price the
owner was willing to accept .... The owner and purchaser were
brought together through plaintiff's efforts. He was the procur-
ing cause of the sale."3
assuming payment of closing costs have the effect of depriving plaintiff of a com-
mission. That a vendor of real estate reduces the price thereof in order to effect a
sale of realty to one previously procured by a real estate agent as his prospective
purchaser does not release the vendor from his liability to pay the agent's com-
mission.
Md at 324.
11. 130 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). Significantly, in Rolston the agency
was for an unspecified term.
12. 194 So. 116 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
13. Id. at 117.
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This rather liberal construction of the procuring cause doctrine
does not entirely square with the court's statement in the Saturn
Realty case." The fact that suspicions of fraud influenced the court's
decision is apparent when the following language of the Sollie deci-
sion is considered:
For reasons best known to him [the purchaser] he sought to cir-
cumvent plaintiff agency and deal directly with the owner ...
As a witness, defendant's president, when asked if he did not
withdraw the exclusive listing from plaintiff immediately after
he had a "nibble" from a prospective purchaser .... replied "It
probably looked that way."'"
It would perhaps have been better for the court to have based
its decision on the fraud, which it appeared to believe to be present,
than to have held that this minimal effort of the broker sufficed to
establish him as the procuring cause. The broker at best merely "in-
terested" the purchaser in the property. Many extension clauses
provide for just such a situation. In essence, the court gave the
broker the benefit of an extension clause even though this agree-
ment contained no such clause.
A fourth case in which the broker was awarded his commission
is Wolf v. Casamento." In this case the broker had caused X to
become interested in the property in question. Unable to agree on a
price, X and the owner arranged a lease of the property. When
broker learned of the lease he contacted the owner, who encouraged
him to continue to pursue X as a potential purchaser. The broker
continued to solicit X until the listing period expired. One month
later, X and the owner agreed to the terms of the sale.
Although X and the owner testified that they were not
negotiating for a sale prior to the expiration of the listing agree-
ment, the court found to the contrary. In ruling that the commission
was earned the court observed:
It is well settled that a real estate agent does not ordinarily
earn his commission unless he procures a purchaser within the
time fixed in his contract. . . . But it has also been established
that the owner is liable to the agent for a commission in cases
where the latter has procured a prospect and the owner has con-
14. 196 So. 2d at 323. See text at note 9, 8upra. The court in Saturn Realty stated
that in order for the broker to be a procuring cause he must have done more than
"[aid] in some degree."
15. 194 So. at 117.
16. 185 So. 537 (La. App. Ol. Cir. 1939).
1016 [Vol. 42
EXTENSION CLA USES
tinued negotiations uninterruptedly with such prospect which
culminate in a sale of the property, even though the transfer is
not made until after the termination of the agency contract....
In the case at bar, we have no hesitancy in holding that [XJ was
the plaintiff's prospect and that the defendant carried on secret
dealings with him, which resulted in the sale of the house on
November 6, 1936, for the purpose of defeating plaintiff's rights
under the agency contract. It therefore follows that [the broker]
is entitled to the recovery of the commission sued for."7
Essential to the court's ruling was the finding that the negotia-
tions between the parties continued uninterruptedly from the ex-
piration of the listing to the time of the eventual purchase. That is,
if the parties had abandoned negotiations, but the tenant had made
an acceptable offer after the expiration of the lease, the broker
would not have been entitled to the commission because there would
have been a break in the continuity of events. If, however, the
broker had arranged for the prospective purchaser to obtain an op-
tion to purchase, the commission would have been earned if and
when the option had been exercised. This was the holding in Mun-
son v. Alello,8 the fifth case in which the broker was successful in
collecting his commission.
The owner was able to avoid paying the broker's commission in
the case of Cobb v. Saucier.1' Following the expiration of the written
listing agreement (on October 5, 1945) the owner verbally authorized
the broker to continue his efforts.") On February 9, 1946, the broker
contacted X with the intention of interesting him in the property in
question. On February 14 the broker showed the property to X, who
offered to purchase it. The owner refused to sell for the price of-
fered. X then advised the broker that he was no longer interested in
the property. There was no further contact between X and the
broker. About three weeks later the owner and the broker con-
versed over the phone; the owner testified that at the time he told
the broker to "drop it-the matter was closed." Two or three days
after this conversation, X contacted the owner, but the parties could
not come to an agreement. The owner placed an ad for the property
in the local paper three weeks later; who should respond but Mr. X1
The two finally agreed to terms on April 20th. The court held that
17. l& at 539.
18. 199 So. 2d 577 (La. App. lst Cir. 1967).
19. 30 So, 2d 784 (La, App. 2d Cir. 1947).
20. The owner testified that there was no such verbal authorization. 30 So. 2d at
785.
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[i]t is not open to question that plaintiff had utterly failed in his
effort to bring defendant and [X] together on comomon ground
.... At that time (termination of the listing) defendant had no
good reason to think or believe that [X] nurtured ambition to
own the [property]; and plaintiff evidently had dismissed him
from consideration as a likely prospect because he had for some
time prior ceased to try to sell him the property or quicken his
interest therein, but had endeavored to sell it to others.
Therefore, it cannot be said that plaintiff's efforts were the pro-
curing cause, except possibly to a very remote exent, of the sale
that was finally made to [X]."'
Taken as a whole, these decisions are faithful to the dictates of
the Louisiana Supreme Court." The broker must have set in motion
a sequence of events which, without break in continuity, culminates
in the sale of the property to a purchaser originally procured by his
efforts. Moreover, these efforts of the broker must have been so
substantial that it can fairly be said that the purchase was at-
tributable to him. If, however, there are indications that the owner
has made a concerted effort to fraudulently reap the benefits of the
broker's services without paying the commission, a lesser effort on
the part of the broker may suffice. In any event, negotiations be-
tween the owner and the purchaser must be continuous.
OBLIGATIONS IF THE AGREEMENT CONTAINS ANY OF THE
VARIOUS KINDS OF EXTENSION CLAUSES
Phrase Requiring Broker to Have "Submitted" Property to the
Purchaser
There is only one Louisiana decision in which the "submitted"
phrase of an extension clause was at issue. In Harvey v. Sims,"3 the
extension clause provided: "If this property, is sold within 180 days
after the termination of this contract to any person to whom S. A.
Harvey [broker] may have submitted the property, directly or in-
directly, while this contract was in force, the commission ...shall
be paid."' The court found that the broker had encouraged X to
purchase the property and that the owner was aware of these
negotiations. In addition, X had actually made a substantial offer for
the property. This offer was never accepted, partially due to the
21. Id. at 787.
22. See text at note 6, supra.
23. 198 So. 389 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940).
24. Id at 390 (emphasis added).
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fact that the owner did not have marketable title-the owner had
been recently widowed and had not yet been sent into possession.
The court held that when X subsequently purchased the property
within the extension period the owner became liable for the commis-
sion.
The court offered no definition of the expression "submitted." It
did, however, quote from a prior Louisiana Supreme Court case:
[The broker's] right to his commission is dependent upon
whether he has found and produced one, who is able, ready, and
willing to buy on the terms prescribed by his principal. When
the broker produces such a purchaser, he is entitled to his com-
mission, although the sale is not consummated, because of the in-
ability of the vendor to comply with the offer. 5
This reference suggests that the lower court did not actually rely
upon the extension clause in reaching the noted result. The implica-
tion seems to be that the broker had found a purchaser ready, will-
ing, and able to buy, but the purchaser was delayed because of the
vendor's inability to produce a marketable title. Left unanswered
was the following question: Does the extension clause allow the
broker to recover his commission if the property is sold within the
extension period to someone to whom the property was "submitted"
(whatever that may mean) even though the prospect was not ready,
willing, and able to buy during the listing period? In other words,
does this extension clause require less of the broker than would
have been required in the absence of such a clause?" In Harvey the
broker's efforts were so clearly the cause of the sale (indeed, he was
the "procuring cause," although the court did not use this expres-
sion) that the above question was never considered.
Phrase Requiring the Broker to Have "Negotiated" With the
Purchaser
A case frequently cited in the context of "negotiation" is a 1926
Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Bullis & Thomas v. Calvert." In
this case the owner signed a' listing agreement authorizing the
brokers to find a purchaser for 7,800 acres of land for a price not
less than $420,000. The listing agreement was to remain in effect un-
til April 1, 1924, but would be extended for thirty days if at that
25. l at 390, (citing Mathews Bros. v. Bernius, 169 La. 1069/ 1076, 126 So. 556,
558 (1930)).
26. See text at notes 6 & 22, supra.
27. 162 La. 378, 110 So. 621 (1926).
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time the brokers had produced an interested buyer. The listing
agreement also carried an extension clause which provided for the
payment of the commission if the property was later sold to anyone
with whom the brokers had been negotiating during the listing
period. This extenstion clause did not have an expiration date.
The brokers immediately began negotiations with X; who ex-
pressed an interest in purchasing approximately three-fourths of the
property-the timbered lands-for $325,000. The broker obtained
from the owner a verbal modification of the brokerage agreement,
allowing a sale of this portion of the property for the net price of
$350,000. Negotiations apparently broke down, and the brokers took
no further action in the matter until April 1, the expiration date.
They requested the thirty day extension, listing among their pro-
spects the company with which X was associated, but the request
for an extension was denied." The owners heard nothing from the
brokers for thirty or forty days and on May 12 gave an option for
the whole 7,800 acres to a company with whom the brokers had not
dealt. This option was never exercised. In July, 1924, the owners
contracted with a second broker to sell only the timbered lands.
This broker contacted X and in September X's company purchased
the property for $350,000. This sale was consummated over five
months after the expiration of the first broker's listing agreement.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the brokers were not
entitled to their commission. The court, quite properly, began by ex-
amining the precise language of the listing agreement and the ex-
tension clause. The listing agreement read as follows:
[Tihis agreement [is] to remain in effect until April 1, 1924, and if
at the end of that time you [brokers] have a good prospective
buyer, we [owners] will extend the time thirty days longer. If we
should sell said property, or any part thereof, after the expira-
tion of this agreement, to a buyer with whom you had been
negotiating prior to expiration of this agreement, we will see
that you are paid a commission of five per cent of the sale
price."9
The court then offered the following interpretation of the exten-
sion clause:
Now that clause is susceptible of but two interpretations: (1)
Taken alone, it may mean that, if plaintiffs should have, at any
28. This fact was disputed at trial. 162 La. at 381, 110 So. at 622.
29. 162 La. at 382-83, 110 So. at 622.
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time before the expiration of the contract started negotiations
with any person by even so much as offering the property to
him, then defendants were to be debarred forever thereafter
from selling their property to such person without paying over
to plaintiffs 5 per cent of the price received; or (2) taken in con-
nection with the clause which immediately precedes it, it may
mean that, if plaintiffs by their efforts had succeeded in so far
interesting some person in the property, that at the expiration
of the contract he might be considered a likely buyer, then
defendants should still pay the commission on any sale made to
him, even though not consummated in the thirty days' extension
provided for in the contract.
But the first interpretation is clearly not admissible. For a con-
tract must represent the will of both parties; and it is in-
conceivable that any sane person would bind himself in that
manner. So that defendants clearly had no intention to bind
themselves to that extent. And we do not understand that plain-
tiffs so contend.
On the other hand, the alternative interpretation is a reasonable
and fair one, and hence must be considered as the common in-
tent of the parties. The more so as it is in strict accord with law,
even independent of contract. For this court has always con-
sistently held that a broker who was the procuring cause of a
sale would be protected as to his commission against any
fraudulent or unfair attempt on the part of his principal to
deprive him thereof."
It is obvious that the question facing the court was as follows:
What effect should be given to an extension clause which is
unlimited in duration? In other states it has been held that in such a
case the clause is effective for a reasonable time.' Had the Loui-
siana Supreme Court taken this view, it would merely have had to
determine: (a) whether what transpired between the broker and X
could be fairly categorized as "negotiations" and (b) whether the
ultimate sale occurred within a reasonable time after the expiration
of the listing. Instead, the court interpreted the extension clause to
mean that the broker was entitled to his commission only if he had
produced a "likely buyer" within the listing period. In determining
whether someone is a "likely buyer," one must apparently deter-
mine whether the broker was the procuring cause of the sale.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Moore v. Holman Real Estate Co., 129 Ark. 465, 196 S.W. 479 (1917);
Stromberg v. Seaton Ranch Co., 502 P.2d 41 (Mont. 1972).
19821 1021
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The mere fact that the sale may in some degree have been aided
by the previous efforts of the broker does not of itself entitle
the latter to a commission; i.e., unless it clearly appears that
those efforts were in fact the procuring cause of the sale.2
Because of the unlimited nature of the extension clause, the
court chose to employ the procuring cause (or "likely buyer") test
even though the extension clause required only that there have
been "negotiations" between the broker and X. Unfortunately, the
Bullis case has on occasion been cited to mean that the procuring
cause test is appropriate even where the extension clause has an ex-
piration date. Clearly, this results in a complete negation of the in-
tent of the extension clause.0 Therefore, it may be suggested that
the Bullis court would better have served the cause of justice had it
simply applied the extension clause for a "reasonable" time. The
court could then have devoted its attention to the terms of the con-
tract which only required some kind of negotiations during the
listing period.
A very different approach to this same "negotiations" issue was
taken by an appellate court in Englemann v. Auderer." In
Englemann, the broker and X had had minimal dealings during the
listing. These dealings consisted of one, possibly two, telephone con-
versations, together with an offer submitted by X. This offer was
not accepted by the owner. However, a sale between the two was
eventually consumated within the three month extension period.
In finding for the plaintiff-broker, the court conceded that the
broker had very little to do with the actual sale to X. Nonetheless,
the court felt that what had transpired between the broker and X
could fairly be described as "negotiations," which is all the exten-
sion clause required. This standard is quite different from that
employed in Bullis, where the unlimited extension period caused the
supreme court to attach a much more restrictive meaning to the ex-
pression "negotiate."
The Englemann court also differed from the Bullis court in that
it refused to give an unusual meaning to the provisions of the con-
tract simply because the result might appear unfair. The Englemann
court stated that "the mere fact that a contract works a hardship
32. 162 La. at 383, 110 So. at 623.
33. See text at note 4, supra.
34. 10 La. App. 136, 121 So. 194 (Orl. Cir. 1929). It is interesting to note that
BuLLis was not cited in this opinion even though it had been decided four years before.
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upon one of the parties does not authorize us to set it aside," and
continued,
The parties were capable of consenting, did consent and the ob-
ject of the contract being lawful, it is a perfectly good private
law between the parties, and, however unwise, or, however
foolish a man may be to enter into such a contract, the courts do
not sit to relieve men of the results of their folly, but sit to en-
force private as well as public laws."
A third case in which the term "negotiate" was used in the ex-
tension clause was that of Adair v. Fleming." During the existence
of the listing, the owner gave the broker the names of several pros-
pects, including X, but told the broker not to contact X as he (X)
would not be interested in the property. Later, another real estate
firm called the broker to discuss the possible sale to X of the prop-
erty in question. At this point the broker contacted X and tried to
persuade him to make an offer, but did not succeed.
Within five days after the expiration of the listing, the broker
gave to the owner a list of people contacted by him during the
listing (this was required by the extension clause). X's name was in-
cluded on the list. Two weeks later X moved onto the property as a
tenant. On the same day, the owner contracted to sell the property
to her brother-in-law, and the next day the brother-in-law sold the
property to X.
The court had no difficulty in finding that the broker was enti-
tled to his commission. Unfortunately, the court did not specifically
state whether the decision was based on a belief that the seller had
perpetrated fraud or a belief that the two meetings between the
broker and X constituted "negotiations." At one point the court
stated that X was "plaintiff's prospect" (suggesting relief based on
contract), but the opinion concluded with the following statement:
The record as a whole amply justifies the conclusion that there
was a studied effort by defendant to defeat plaintiff's right to a
commission on the sale of the property after he had spent money
advertising it, and time contacting prospects, including [X], in ef-
forts to sell it. We also believe that [XI was trying to help in the
plan to avoid the payment of a commission to plaintiff.a"
35. 10 La. App. at 137, 121 So. at 195.
36. 68 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
37. Id at 219.
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The recent case of Harkey v. Gahagan'3 involves an extension
clause employing the term "submitted" as well as "negotiate." The
listing period was twelve months as was the extension period, the
latter to become applicable if the property was sold "to anyone with
whom said agent or owner had negotiated or to whom this property
had been shown or submitted prior to the termination. .. ."
At the time the listing agreement was signed, the owner told
the broker that X was a likely prospect. X had in fact previously of-
fered the owner $150,000 for the property. The broker called X and
told him that the property was for sale through his agency for
$167,100. X advised the broker that he was not interested. This was
the only contact between the two during the listing period. Some five
months after the expiration of the listing agreement, X purchased
the property (along with an additional 2.14 acres of adjacent land)
directly from the owner for $150,000.
In a well-reasoned opinion, the appellate court affirmed the trial
judge's judgment for the defendant-owner. In so doing, the court
modified two questionable pronouncements of the lower court. The
trial court had said that the commission was not owed because the
price ultimately paid was less than that asked in the listing and
because a different amount of acreage had been sold. The appellate
court correctly stated that "[c]ircumstances such as these do not
necessarily deprive the realtor of the right to his commission, if he
is otherwise entitled thereto."'" The appellate court also rejected the
trial court's prounouncement that the broker must have been the
procuring cause of the sale:
The realtor does not have to be the procuring cause in order
to activate the extension clause. He need not have been involved
in active negotiation with the purchaser at the time of the ex-
piration of the primary term. However, his activities must have
been the cause of creating some minimal interest in the pur-
chaser which contributed to bring, about the eventual sale."
In support of this holding, the court quoted common law authorities.
Particularly cogent is the following statement from a 1963 California
decision: "There must be some minimal causal relationship between
38. 338 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
39. d. at 135. (emphasis added).
40. Id
41. Id.
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the activities of the broker during the listing period and the
ultimate sale."'2
Thus, the Harkey case unequivocally repudiates the lingering
misconception (caused by previous interpretations of Bullis) that a
broker can recover his commission only if the ultimate purchaser
was a "likely buyer" at the time of the termination of the listing. In-
stead, all that is required is some minimal causal relationship be-
tween the activities of the broker and the prospect's decision to buy.
Presumably the necessary activities would be those specified in the
extension clause (negotiation, submission, etc.). The Harkey case ap-
parently would require the broker to prove two things in order to
recover his commission under the extension clause: (1) that he car-
ried on the kind of activity specified in the extension clause, and (2)
that the activity created some minimal interest in the purchaser
which contributed to the eventual sale.
After applying this "minimal interest" test, the Harkey court
ruled for the defendant. The court expressed no opinion as to
whether the single telephone conversation constituted a "negotia-
tion" or a "submission" of the property. Instead, the court stated
that the activities of the broker did not create any minimal interest
in X, since X was already familiar with the property (having
previously offered to purchase it), had expressed no immediate in-
terest in the property for the price listed, and since more than one
year had elapsed between the broker's discussion with X and the
ultimate sale.
Phrase Requiring the Broker to Have "Quoted" the Property
There are many cases where the expressions "quote," "had
quoted," or "had been quoted" are at issue. In most of these cases
the courts have been faithful to the language of the extension
clause, allowing the broker to recover even though the "quote" did
not result in extensive negotiations.
A frequently cited case is Ruiz v. Keihm's Pharmacy,'8 in which
a drugstore was listed with the broker. Included in the agreement
was a forty-five day extension clause. During the listing the broker
was contacted by another drugstore owner (X), who later testified
that he was merely curious about the asking prices of neighboring
42. Korstad v. Hoffman, 221 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 805, 35 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1963) (cited
at 338 So. 2d at 136).
43. 37 Soo2d 720 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948).
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drugstores. The broker, on the other hand, testified that he was in
almost continuous negotiations with X during the listing and was ac-
tually able to get the owner to reduce his asking price in order to in-
duce X to purchase the property. The court decided that, in spite of
X's protestations, he was more than a disinterested inquirer. In rul-
ing for the plaintiff, the court stated that "[e]ven if it was merely
quoted to him [X] by [the broker], we think that under the terms of
the contract there would be liability in plaintiff as a result of the
ultimate sale to [X].""
The court went on to distinguish the Bullis case, which required
that X be considered a "likely purchaser." The Bullis case was not
considered a controlling precedent since the extension clause in that
case had no reasonable time limit attached and involved the expres-
sion "negotiate," which, in the opinion of the court, obviously meant
more than merely "to quote." According to the Ruiz court, to
"quote" property "means nothing more than to offer it and to state
the price asked."'5 To negotiate means to succeed "in so far in-
teresting some person in the property, that at the expiration of the
contract he might be considered a likely buyer.""
The Ruiz decision was cited with approval in the case of Searcy
v. Jacobs."1 In this case X noticed the broker's ad in the newspaper
and telephoned the broker. The broker said that the lprice was
$135,000. The broker later called X back and said that the price had
been reduced to $110,000. This was the only contact between the
broker and X, although the broker later obtained the key to the
house and gave it to a second broker who showed the house to X.
This showing occurred during the extension period as did the even-
tual purchase.
In finding for the broker, the court approved the Ruiz definition
of "quote," namely, "to offer it and to state the price asked." Apply-
ing that definition to the facts at hand, the Searcy court maintained
that
the statement by [the broker] in the original conversation that
the owner was asking $135,000.00 for the property, as well as
the subsequent call by [the broker] telling [X] that the price had
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 725 (citation omitted). Recall that in the authors' view the construction
of the term "negotiate" was unnecessarily restrictive in Bu~lis, due to the fact that the
extension period was unlimited. See text at notes 27-34, supra.
47. 151 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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dropped to $110,000.00, was a "quoting;" and under LSA-C.C.
1901, the terms of the contract was law to the parties thereto
and [the owner] is liable to [the broker] for her commission."
In reaching the stated result, the court may have been influ-
enced somewhat by its belief that the broker had in fact done more
than merely quote the property. It was concluded that, by advertis-
ing the property, conversing with X, giving X's name to the owner,
giving X the address, and actually helping X to see the property,
the broker continuously pursued the sale, and thus it was fair that
she should receive her commission.
The Ruiz decision was distinguished in the case of Woodworth v.
Grubb," in which the broker and X had no relations whatsoever un-
til one day after the expiration of the listing. X had, though, been
shown the property by the owner the day before the listing expired.
The owner then directed X to the broker, but the meeting between
X and the broker did not occur until two days later, at which time
the listing had expired. The question in this case was whether the
action of the owner in showing the house could be construed as a
"quote" under the extension clause. The court found for the owner
and distinguished the Ruiz case as follows:
Suffice it to say that the Ruiz case involved a quote by the real
estate agency and not the owner and is not applicable here....
[W]e are of the opinion that mere mention by the owner of the
asking price in response to an inquiry by [X] does not amount to
a "quote" envisioned by the contract. On the contrary, this
would be a natural thing to do when a prospective purchaser ap-
pears to look at a house and make inquiry. The contract itself
provides for the referral of a prospective purchaser to the
realtor who had an exclusive listing (which was done in this mat-
ter), and thus he is contemplated as the party who must do the
"quoting" and not the owner. Therefore there was no breach of
contract by [the owner]."
It thus seems clear that a "quote" by the owner does not implement
the extension clause, but a "quote" by the broker does. One might
criticize the result in Woodworth by observing that the owner had,
in fact, done more than merely state the price, having actually
shown the property to the prospect. 1
48. Id at 169.
49. 196 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
50. Id. at 288.
51. This problem of direct negotiation by the owner will be considered in a subse-
quent section. See text at note 88, infra.
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Caruso-Goll v. La Nasal' and Alex F. Dreyfus Co. v. Friedman"
are two cases in which the expression "quoted," though used in the
extension clause, was not a significant factor in the courts' decisions.
Irf Caruso-Gott, the broker had been negotiating with X, and during
the extension period the property was sold to X's mother. It was
held that for purposes of this case negotiating with X during the
listing was equivalent to negotiating with the eventual purchaser; X
had acted as his mother's agent in the past and she frequently relied
on his advice in matters of real estate. The court did not discuss
what the expression "quoted" might require of a broker, citing only
a case involving the procuring cause doctrine."
In Dreyfus, the court concluded that X had "negotiated" for the
property during the listing period. Since the extension clause re-
quired only that a "quote" have occurred, one might surmise that, in
this court's opinion, a "negotiation" necessarily involves a "quote" of
the property by the broker. The court did point out that there was a
considerable difference between this case and those cited by
defendant-owner's counsel in which the listing did not include an ex-
tension clause. 5 The court recognized that the extension clause gave
the broker rights which would not have otherwise existed and that
no good reason could be found "why [the owner] should not be bound
by that stipulation in her contract.""6
Coppage v. Camelo"' is one case in which the expression
"quoted" was used in the extension clause and yet the broker was
unable to collect his commission. In this case the purchaser was an
adjacent landowner who had long been interested in buying the pro-
perty. When contacted by the broker, X said that he did not want to
buy through an agent. He said, "You don't need to talk to me, about
the land next door, I know all about it ... there is no way that I am
going to buy it through a real estate agent . ..." The court stated
that under no circumstances could it be said that the broker found
this buyer. Insofar as the exact language of the extension clause
was concerned, the court said that "quoted" means that the price
must at least have been stated. Apparently X did not allow the
broker to get even that far. This case might be compared to Harkey
62. 72 So. 2d 13 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954).
53. 171 La. 90, 129 So. 679 (1930).
54. 72 So. 2d at 16. The cited case was Cruse v. Bruscato, 28 So. 2d 56 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1946). See text at note 6, supra.
55. 171 La. at 94, 129 So. at 679.
56. 171 La. at 93, 129 So. at 680.
57. 330 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
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v. Gahagan," in which the extension clause used the expressions
"negotiate" and "submit." The defendant was successful in Harkey
because, even though there may have been a "submission" of the
property, the purchaser was already familiar with it and did not
have his interest quickened by the efforts of the broker. It might
therefore be deduced that even had the broker in Coppage been able
to state the asking price, he would not have been entitled to his
commission, since the quote would not have inspired any minimal in-
terest which did not already exist.
Phrase Requiring the Broker to Have "Interested" Purchaser in the
Property
Many extension clauses today (four out of the ten examined) use
the "interested" expression. Surprisingly, only two reported deci-
sions deal with this type of clause, and neither offers any definition
of "interested." Instead, the decisions seem to suggest that this
language requires that the broker be the procuring cause of the
sale. For the reasons previously given, however, the procuring cause
doctrine should be applicable only in the absence of an extension
clause."
In Cramer v. Guercio,10 the agreement contained a six-month ex-
tension clause, but the court found the clause inoperative since the
property was later listed with a second broker.' Thus, the court
quite properly devoted considerable time to the question of procur-
ing cause. Unfortunately, the court failed to make it clear that the
procuring cause doctrine was considered relevant only because it
was found that the extension clause was without effect. In a subse-
quent case, Carter v. Hayes," the Cramer precedent was misapplied.
In ruling for the defendant, the Carter court, citing Cramer, made
the following statement: "The mere fact that the sale may have been
in some way aided by the efforts of the agent does not alone entitle
the agent to his commission. 'Interesting a purchaser' is often refer-
red to in our case law as 'procuring cause."'"
The problems with the Carter decision are apparent. The court
in Cramer discussed procuring cause only because it felt the exten-
sion clause had been voided when the second listing agreement was
58. See text at note 38, supra.
59. See text at note 6, supra.
60. 331 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
61. This question is discussed in a subsequent section. See text at note 94. infra.
62. 337 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
63. Id.
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made. It is most illogical to assert that a broker who has an exten-
sion clause allowing a commission if he merely "interests" the even-
tual purchaser has no greater rights than a broker who is without
such protection and who must prove that he "procured" the sale. If
the Carter precedent is accepted, then extension clauses using that
expression are virtually useless. Such a result would be irrational
and unfair, especially since one might reasonably believe that the
"interested" expression should be the most liberally interpreted of
all those used in extension clauses. "Quoting" property or
"negotiating" for a sale clearly requires some contact between the
broker and the purchaser, but it is conceivable for a purchaser to
have become "interested" in a listed property through a broker's
advertising efforts without any actual contact between the parties.
There is, of course, no doubt that the cited language in Carter is
logically and legally unsupportable. Unfortunately, the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied writs in the case, stating that "on the facts
found by the Court of Appeal, there is no error of law in its jud,-
ment."' This statement can perhaps be explained by noting that the
plaintiff broker won the case at the appellate level; he was able to
prove that he was the procuring cause of the sale. If he was the pro-
curing cause, then surely he "interested" the purchaser in the prop-
erty. On that factual basis the decision is correct. It is difficult to
believe that the supreme court meant to sanction the appellate
court's equating of "procuring cause" with "interesting."
OBLIGATIONS IF THE SALE IS COMPLETED AFTER THE EXPIRATION
OF THE EXTENSION CLAUSE
As noted earlier the procuring cause doctrine is applicable in
the absence of an extension clause." There are two other situations
in which this doctrine becomes relevant. The first situation occurs
when the broker has been given a non-exclusive agency (sometimes
described as an "exclusive agency to sell"). In this situation the
broker is not entitled to a commission if the owner sells the proper-
ty himself. Thus, it must be determined which of the two parties
(broker or owner) is to receive credit for the sale. Since almost all
listing agreements today provide for the payment of the commission
even if the owner completes the sale himself (an "exclusive right to
sell"), this situation will not be considered in this article.
64. 339 So. 2d 854 (La. 1976).
65. As has been seen, some courts incorrectly apply it even where there is an ex-
tension clause. See text at notes 22, 26. 33, 54 & 62, supra.
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The second situation for which the procuring cause doctrine is
relevant occurs when, subsequent to the expiration of the extension
clause, the property is sold by the owner to someone who had
previously bargained with the broker during the listing period. In
this instance the broker may no longer rely on the protection afford-
ed him by the extension clause, since it has now expired. Having no
contractual protection, he must rely upon the same argument
employed by brokers whose listing agreements do not include exten-
sion clauses; that is, justice requires that compensation be paid for
those services of which the owner availed himself."
In Hamberlin v. Bourgeois" and Womack Agencies v. Fisher,"
the brokers were successful in collecting their commissions. In
Hamerlin, the listing agreement was for ninety days with a sixty-
day extension clause. The purchase was completed twenty-four days
after the expiration of the extension period. In reversing the holding
of the district judge, the appellate court found that, while there was
no evidence of collusion between the owner and X to deprive the
broker of his commission, the broker was the procuring cause of the
sale and was thus entitled to the commission. During the primary
term of the agreement, the property was shown by the broker to X.
'X expressed a desire to purchase the property, and the broker
assisted him in filling out an F.H.A. loan application. Approval of
the loan was delayed due to a shortage of F.H.A. funds and did not
occur until both the primary and the extension periods had expired.
The sale was concluded shortly thereafter at a price of $93,000,
rather than the original asking price of $95,000. In finding for the
broker, the court recognized that even though a broker may have
been of some assistance in bringing parties together, he is not enti-
tled to a commission when negotiations have ceased and the owner
himself reopens negotiations and completes the sale. In this case,
however, there was no cessation of negotiations, but rather a con-
tinuous, uninterrupted transaction."1
In discussing whether the broker was the "procuring cause" of
the sale, the court pointed out that the buyer approached the broker
and expressed an interest in buying a "place." The broker showed
the property in question, assisted in the appraisal by F.H.A., and
helped the buyer apply for the loan. The court had no doubt that the
broker was ultimately responsible for the sale.
66. See text at note 6, supra.
67. 289 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
68. 86 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1956).
69. See text at note 22, supra.
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In the Womack case, the property was sold only two days after
the expiration of the extension period, and there was some evidence
that the parties had informally agreed to the sale during the exten-
sion period. The buyer testified that he had been interested in buy-
ing the property before it was listed with the broker, but the court
found that this interest had been minimal. The testimony revealed
that upon termination of the primary term on September 22, 1953,
the broker was requested to continue negotiations with X. On Oc-
tober 8, X offered $20,350 for the propery, which was rejected. On
October 24 (two days after the expiration of the extension period) X
and the owner agreed to a sale price of $20,000. The court said that:
"[pirocuring cause" refers to the efforts of a broker in introduc-
ing, producing, finding, or interesting a purchaser, and means
that negotiations which eventually lead to a sale, must be the
result of some active effort of the broker."
In this case the court found that the broker was the "procuring
cause" in that he had attempted to interest about twenty prospects
in the house, had secured an F.H.A. appraisal at his own expense,
had conducted extensive negotiations with the eventual purchaser
(even, at the owner's request, beyond the listing period), and had in
fact secured an offer which was $350 greater than the price for
which the property was subsequently sold.
In both Hamerlin and Womack it was apparent that owner and
buyer were quite close to consummating a bargain when the listing
period expired and that the contracts which did result were virtual-
ly identical to those negotiated by the brokers. These facts were not
present in those cases where the brokers were denied commissions.
In Gardner v. Fonseca,' the property was sold two months after the
forty-five day extension period had expired. The eventual purchaser
had made an offer during the listing period, but it was rejected by
the owner partially because the price was too low and partially
because the offer was conditioned upon the buyer being able to sell
his own house. The offer which was ultimately accepted did not have
the above condition, and was $1,500 higher than the first offer. In
finding that the broker had not earned his commission, the court
stated:
Counsel argued that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the
sale, but according to our understanding of the meaning of the
term, we do not think so. For the broker to be regarded as the
70. 86 So. 2d at 734.
71. 85 So. 2d 524 (La. App. Or|. Cir. 1956).
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procuring cause, the negotiations which eventually lead to the
sale must be the result of some active effort on the part of the
broker.... The only effort put forth by the broker in the instant
case was to submit a purchase offer from one who was then not
ready or able to buy defendant's property, and after the offer
was rejected by defendant, the whole matter seems to have
been abandoned by plaintiff and defendant. We do not believe
that the listing contract contemplated that the real estate agent
would be entitled to a commission for producing a prospective
purchaser who is neither ready nor able to buy and who cannot
and does not make a firm offer to purchase until a date after the
contract with the real estate agent has expired."
Langford v. Pioneer Land Company" is a case involving the sale
of leasehold rights. The listing period was only ten days with a
sixty-day extension. The eventual purchaser had originally been
shown the property by the broker, but later bargained directly with
the owner. These negotiations were terminated when the owner
gave a second purchaser a one and one-half month option on the
property. When that purchaser failed to exercise his option, negotia-
tions were re-opened with X, and a sale of the leasehold occurred
about one month after the expiration of the extension. The court
failed to discuss the question of procuring cause, but did hold that
there was no evidence of collusion or an intent to deprive the broker
of his fee. It seems apparent that the eventual sale was not the
result of on-going negotiations and that even had the plaintiff
argued "procuring cause" more vigorously (as opposed to claiming
fraud and bad faith) he could not have succeeded.
In Mathews v. Cacioppo," property listed with a broker was
leased to X for six months, with an option to purchase. Three
months after the lease expired, X finally decided to purchase the
property, the owner agreeing to accept the same price quoted in the
option. The eventual sale occurred long after the forty-five day ex-
tension period had expired. The court found that there was no
evidence of collusion between the owner and the buyer. The court
also accepted as true X's testimony that he had abandoned the idea
of purchasing the property and had subsequently purchased it only
as a result of new and independent negotiations with the owner. The
court ruled that
72. Id.
73. 250 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
74. 172 So. 584 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
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[tihe mere fact that the sale was made to a prospect obtained by
[the broker] is not sufficient to entitle him to a commission on a
sale effected by [the owner] after the expiration of the time limit
in his contract in the absence of any showing of collusion or that
plaintiff's efforts were the procuring cause of the sale. 5
The recent case of Sleet v. Harding" also involved a sale subse-
quent to the expiration of an extension clause. The owner entered
into two listing agreements with the broker, the first commencing in
1973, and the second commencing in January, 1976, and expiring in
July of the same year. There was an extension period which ended
ninety days later, in October of 1976. In June, 1975, the house had
not been sold, and in order to derive some income from the property
the owner decided to rent it to X. In July, 1977, nine months after
the expiration of the extension clause on the second contract, X
decided to purchase the property. The broker then claimed his com-
mission on the basis of his attempt to interest X in purchasing the
property at the time he was a tenant-the broker had obtained a
verbal offer from X during the listing period. The appellate court re-
jected this claim, citing with approval the written reasons of the
trial judge:
[A]ll plaintiff has proved to the court is that he made an unsuc-
cessful attempt to sell [the owner's] house in 1975 to persons
who were already living in the house. After these negotiations
broke down, plaintiff had contact with the buyers by acting as
defendant's rental agent. More than two years later defendant
initiated entirely new negotiations directly with the buyers,
without any participation by plaintiff, and sold the home under
completely different terms than those proposed two years
earlier. Under these circumstances plaintiffs actions cannot be
considered the procuring cause of the sale. Thus plaintiff is not
entitled to a commission."
75. Id at 586.
76. 383 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 124. The trial judge also found that:
Other testimony offered at trial led this court to believe that plaintiff was not the
procuring cause of sale. One thing is that the alleged offer made by [X] through
[the broker] was not put in writing, although to do so is mandatory industry
caustom [sicl. Another is that plaintiff never "registered" [X] [as a buyer],
although plaintiff testified that it is customary in the realty business to do so.
Also, plaintiff denied being involved in negotiations of any kind with [X] when
questioned by Rod Noles, another broker who was trying to sell the house in May
of 1977. This denial by plaintiff was made at the very time that defendant and IX]
were negotiating their deal.
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In summarizing these decisions, one need only restate the obser-
vations made when reviewing the procuring cause doctrine. 8 In
order to recover his commission, the broker must be able to show
that he set in motion an uninterrupted sequence of events that even-
tually resulted in the sale of the property to the prospect originally
produced by him. This means that the negotiations must have been
started by the broker during the listing period and continued by the
owner throughout the extension period and beyond. The more
lengthy the extension period, the more difficult the task of proving
the continuous nature of the negotiations. In those cases in which
the broker was able to collect his commission, the sale was com-
pleted shortly after the extension period expired. This seems to
have aroused in the court a suspicion of fraud on the part of the
owner, making it somewhat easier to rule that the commission
should be paid.
MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
Time Considerations in Determining the Applicability of
Extension Clauses
It is obvious that, in order to recover under the listing agree-
ment, the described activity must have been conducted by the
broker during the listing period." In addition, the sale must have
transpired within the extension period or very soon after its expira-
tion. In many of the cases previously discussed, there was some
question as to whether these time constraints had been met. Two
cases in this area with particularly interesting facts are Zollinger v.
Gust" and Cary v. Humble. 1 The Zollinger case holds that a verbal
agreement to sell, confected within the extension period, is suffi-
cient to implement the extension clause. The court gave no attention
to the argument that verbal agreements to buy and sell immovables
are not enforceable. Furthermore, the court took into consideration
neither that the verbal agreement was conditional upon the pur-
chaser's obtaining a specified loan nor that the act of sale was pass-
ed after the extension had expired. So long as it could be proven
that the agreement was entered into (verbally or otherwise) during
the extension, the broker's commission was due.
78. See text at note 22, supra.
79. See Woodworth v. Grubbs, 196 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
80. 192 So. 132 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939).
81. 212 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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In Carey v. Humble the owner listed his property for three
months (expiration date: July 15, 1965). The agreement was later ex-
tended to August 15. Each of the contracts contained a six-month
extension clause. During the period of the first contract the realtor
showed the property to X, who showed no interest at that time. His
interest was aroused in January of 1966, whereupon he called the
broker about the property. Having been told that it was no longer
being listed, X contacted the owner, and on January 16, 1966, an
agreement was reached for the sale of the property. This was six
months and one day after the expiration of the first listing, but
within the extension period of the second listing.
The court held that, since there had been no contact between
the broker and X during the period of the second listing, the second
listing agreement was totally irrelevant. In addition, the court
specifically held that there had been no collusion between the owner
and X to deprive the broker of his commission. This conclusion is
supported to some extend by the fact that in January X contacted
the broker when his interest was renewed. On the other hand, the
fact that the parties completed their sale only one day after the ex-
piration of the extension period might appear suspicious to some.
Nonetheless, as a result of its analysis, the court denied the commis-
sion on the grounds that the extension period had expired prior to
the sale.
It is somewhat surprising that the Carey court did not give
greater attention to the question of whether the extension clause
should have run from August 15 rather then July 15, in which case
the sale would have occurred within the extension period. According
to the court's analysis, the parties might be said to have entered in-
to two entirely distinct contractual relations. However, in light of
the fact that the language of the two contracts was identical (except
for the expiration dates), one might argue that the second agree-
ment was intended only to extend the original listing from three
months to four rather than to create an entirely separate obligation.
There would then be a single listing period of four months duration,
and the extension clause would apply to all prospects contacted by
the broker within the four month period. This interpretation would
appear to be more in line with the reasonable expectations of the
parties.
In Gaspard v. Siggio,6 the owner entered into a listing agree-
ment with the broker in which he agreed to pay the broker a corn-
82. 313 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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mission of ten per cent upon the sale of 160 acres of land; there was
also a ninety-day extension period. The broker was paid his commis-
sion on a portion of the property sold within ninety days after the
termination of his contract, but it was held that the broker was not
entitled to commission on the sale of the remaining acreage since
that portion was not sold until after the extension period had ex-
pired.
Finally, it should be recalled that the supreme court in Bullis &
Thomas v. Calbert88 interpreted an extension clause without an ex-
piration date as requiring that the broker produce, during the
primary period, a purchaser who could be'described as a "likely
buyer." As noted by an appellate court in Ruiz v. Kiehm's Phar-
macy," this essentially negates the effect of the extension clause.
The courts in other states generally have not taken this approach,
but have instead enforced the clause according to its terms for a
?'reasonable" time.8
The Effect of the Termination of a Listing Agreement on an
Extension Clause
In Tharp v. Tracy," the listing period was set for forty days to
be followed by a six-month extension period. During the listing
period the broker exhibited the property to X. X made an offer of
$9,250, which was not accepted by the owner. A short time later the
listing was cancelled by mutual agreement of the broker and owner.
Sixteen days after the cancellation the owner sold the property to X
for the price of $9,250.
Saying that the termination of a listing contract did not in effect
also terminate an extension clause connected therewith, the court
held that the broker was entitled to a commission on the sale. The
court states that to rescind a contract is to undo it from the begin-
ning. What occurred here was a termination, an abrogation of only
so much of the contract as remains unperformed; "[tjo constitute an
abandonment of rights, an actual intent to abandon must exist."87 In
essence the listing agreement was not abrogated entirely, only
modified as to the expiration date.
83. See text at note 27, aupra.
84. See text at note 43, supra.
85. See note 31, supra.
86. 40 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949).
87. fd at 511 (citing 17 C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 412 at 899).
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The Effect of Direct Negotiations by the Owner During the Listing
Period
Most listing contracts are exclusive, requiring that all potential
purchasers be directed to the broker. One would thus assume that,
if the owner himself should carry on a designated activity (quoting',
negotiating, submitting, etc.), the broker should receive the benefit
of that service for the purpose of implementing the extension clause.
As demonstrated by Woodworth v. Grubb," this is not always the
case. Recall that in Woodworth the owner had actually shown a pro-
spect the house the day before the listing expired. The court said
that the implication of the extension clause was that the broker, not
the owner, must make the quote. This decision is not quite so harsh
(from the broker's perspective) as might appear at first blush, since
the owner did refer X to the broker. By the time X actually met
with the broker, however, the listing had expired. One might sur-
mise that the outcome might have been different had the owner
neglected to refer the prospect; this might have been construed as
contractual breach, resulting in liability.
Two cases in which the brokers were allowed their commissions
as a result of the owner's activities were Doll v. Thornhill"' and Cop.
page v. Woodward.? In Doll, the parties executed a six-month listing
agreement in which the owner agreed to refer all applicants to the
broker. There was no extension clause. It seems that during the
listing period the owner struck a bargain with X, in which it was
agreed that if the broker could not sell the property during the
listing, the owner would sell it to X. This is precisely what occurred
three weeks after the listing expired. The court found for the
broker, holding that the owner, had breached the contract. It was
stated that the broker should have been given at least the oppor.
tunity to complete the sale. In addition, it was deemed possible that
the broker may have influenced the buyer indirectly by means of his
advertising efforts. The court said, however, it was not necessary
for the broker to prove that his efforts produced the sale: The
listing contract was exclusive, therefore the broker should reap the
benefits of the owner's marketing efforts.
The Coppage case did involve an extension clause, which
employed the term "quoted." Once again there were negotiations
between the owner and X during the listing, but in this case it ap-
88. See text at note 49, supra.
89. 6 So. 2d 793 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
90. 105 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
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pears that the broker also had contact with X and may actually have
shown him the house on one occasion. Regardless of the resolution
of this disputed fact, the court said that the main consideration was
that the owner did not direct the prospect to the broker as he was
required to do under the contract. Citing Doll v. Thornhill, the Cop-
page court held that in such circumstances the commission must be
paid.
A case decided four years after Coppage had quite a contrary
result. In Acadian Investment Co. v Laird,"1 there was a three and
one-half month listing agreement for the sale of a 1,275 acre planta-
tion. There was also a one year extension clause. During the listing
the owner agreed to sell one-half of the acreage to X if the broker
was unable to sell the whole during the listing. The owner never
referred X to the broker, but the broker learned indirectly of the
negotiations and met with X to offer his assistance. The broker
made no actual attempt to sell X the property and, in fact, did not
identify himself as the owner's agent.
Two weeks after the expiration of the listing, the owner sold an
800-acre portion of the tract to X. When the broker sued for his
commission, the court conceded that the plaintiff had presented a
strong case, but it nonetheless ruled for the defendant. The court at-
tached great significance to the fact that the broker had learned of
the negotiations with X and had actually met with him. It was
therefore concluded that the owner's breach had not adversely af-
fected the broker: He had been given every opportunity to complete
the sale with X and had failed to so do.
This approach clearly is quite different from that taken by the
Coppage court, which emphasized the owner's contractual breach in
failing to refer the prospect to the broker. In Acadian, the focus is
upon the broker. The implication is that, regardless of the owner's
transgressions, the broker should not be awarded his commission
unless he makes some reasonable effort to effect a sale. Citing with
approval the opinion of the trial judge, the Acadian court stated
that
plaintiff was not deprived, by reason of [the owner's] breach of
contract, of the opportunity to sell to his prospect. The reason
for the rule failing, then the rule itself must fail, with the result
that the plaintiff cannot recover .... 11
In reading the decision one might surmise that the true reason
91. 138 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
92. Id. at 432.
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for the court's ruling was its reluctance to award a very sizable coin-
mission to a broker whose efforts to sell the property were rather
minimal. In addition, the court seemed desirous of limiting its deci-
sion to the precise facts of the case at hand, concluding that "the
defendants are not liable for the real estate agent's commission
under the particular circumstances reflected by this record. .. ."
No attempt was made to distinguish the case from Coppage v.
Woodward.
In reviewing the cases noted in this section, it can be seen that
a critical factor is the owner's referral of the prospect to the broker.
The Doll and Coppage cases suggest that if this does not occur, the
commission is owed. The Acadian Investment Co. case qualifies this
.result by holding that if the broker should learn indirectly of the ex-
istence of the prospect, he must make some reasonable effort to
quicken the prospect's interest. This conclusion is not entirely sup-
ported by logic nor by the Coppage precedent, but the Acadian
court may have been influenced by the unusual facts of that case.
Denial of Brokerage Fee if a Second Broker is Hired During the
Extension Period
In both Englemann v. Auderer" and Alex F. Dreyfus v. Fried-
man," the respective courts allowed the plaintiff-brokers to recover
their commissions even though the owners had subsequently listed
the property with second brokers. The owners were required to pay
two commissions. Neither court gave any attention to this problem.
The unexpressed philosophy seemed to be that if a seller has dealt
with two brokers, both of whom have become entitled to a commis-
sion by the wording of their contracts, the seller should be liable to
both. If such were not the case, one realtor would be unjustly
deprived of the efforts of his labor. Although double payment
creates a hardship upon the owner, the Englemann court noted
(albeit in another context) that "the mere fact that a contract works
a hardship upon one of the parties does not authorize us to set it
aside.""
The only Louisiana case in which the subsequent listing problem
is discussed directly is Cramer v. Guercio.'7 The court in this case
held that, contrary to the precedent set in Englemann and Dreyfus,
93. Id
94. 10 La. App. 136, 121 So. 194 (Orl. Cir. 1929). See text at note 34, supra.
95. 171 La. 90, 129 So. 679 (1930). See text at note 53, supra.
96. See text at note 35, aupra.
97. 331 So. 2d 550 (La. App. lst Cir. 1976). See text at note 60, supra, where this
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the subsequent listing of the property with a second broker serves
to cancel the extension clause. In reaching this conclusion the
Cramer court was impressed with the testimony of several
witnesses, qualified in the real estate profession, to the effect that
the purpose of the extension clause was to protect the broker from
a private sale by the owner subsequent to the listing, and the clause
had no application if the property was listed a second time." The
court observed that the listing form in question had been prepared
by real estate agents, rendering the interpretation by the
defendant's witnesses (local agents) especially persuasive. Finally,
the court noted that if the clause was applicable, the owner could be
liable for multiple commission and "sanctioning such a result is an
absurdity."" As has been noted, several courts in the past have
ordered exactly this kind of double payment. The Cramer court was
the first to perceive this as an injustice.
It might be observed that following this decision the listing form.
recommended by the Board of Realtors in that particular, parish was
changed and now specifically provides that the extension clause
should be inoperative if the property is subsequently listed with
another broker. Of the ten listing forms examined which contained
an extension clause, seven had such a provision; three did not. The
Cramer precedent suggests that trial courts should solicit testimony
from local experts to determine the custom of the particular areas in
which these forms are used.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
When a listing agreement contains an extension clause, it
becomes the task of the judiciary to enforce that provision as the
law between the parties or to declare the provision unenforceable as
contrary to public policy." Those courts which steadfastly apply the
procuring cause doctrine despite the presence of an extension clause
fail to shoulder this burden. A cursory examination of the extension
clause should immediately reveal that the broker in no way
obligates himself to be the procuring cause of the sale; it is
necessary only that the purchaser be one to whom the property was
quoted or submitted by the broker, with whom negotiations have
transpired, or who has become interested in the property through
case is discussed in connection with the expression "become interested" as used in the
extension clause.
98. The plaintiff-broker's argument that this testimony was inadmissible under
the parol evidence rule was rejected. Id at 553.
99. Id at 554.
100. This latter argument has never been advanced strenuously.
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the broker's efforts. It is also reasonable to require the broker's
designated activity to have created some minimal interest on the
part of the purchaser.
A related difficulty is the frequent failure of Louisiana courts to
recognize that the actions of the broker should be measured against
the dictates of his, contract. If the contract requires "negotiations,"
for example, that term should be defined and there should then
follow an inquiry as to whether the broker's actions satisfied his
obligation as specified in the contract and defined by the court. In
addition, it should be recognized that many cases may be unreliable
or inapplicable due to the differences in the terminology of the two
extension clauses. Where contractual terminology differs, it should
be presumed that obligations also differ.
Insofar as the drafting of an extension clause is concerned, it ap-
pears that the expresion "quoted" has been contrued as requiring
the least amount of contact between the broker and the purchaser.
It has been specifically held that to "quote" property means merely
to offer it and to state the price asked, whereas to "negotiate"
means to produce someone who might be considered a "likely
buyer."'' One might suppose that the broker would be afforded
maximum protection if the extension clause required merely that he
"interest" a purchaser, but a recent appellate court decision equates
this expression (perhaps incorrectly) with "procuring cause," the
most stringent standard possible."2 In light of this uncertainty, an
extension clause combining several of the common expressions
might be desirable. Consider the following proposed language, for
example:
... to any purchaser to whom said property has been quoted or
who has become interested in said property as a result of the ef-
forts or advertising of said REALTOR ...
This particular extension clause, combining the expressions
"quoted" and 'interesting a purchaser," might afford the greatest
protection to the broker. The former expression is desirable since it
has been given a very liberal interpretation by Louisiana courts.
Although the latter phrase has been given a narrow meaning, it
would seem to require a minimal amount of contact between the
broker and the eventual purchaser and, when combined with
"quoted," might achieve a result beneficial to the broker.
101. This is how the Ruiz court interpreted the Bullis case, although as has been
said the Bullis court gave a very strict meaning to "negotiate" because the extension
clause had no expiration date. See text at notes 45 & 46, supra.
102. See Carter v. Hayes, discussed at note 62, supra.
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